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In a case that gives the term “family values” an entirely new meaning, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently charged a father and son in Lexington, S.C., with operating a fraudulent investment program designed to illegally profit from the deaths of terminally ill individuals.

On September 20, 2013, the SEC alleged that Benjamin S. Staples and his son Benjamin O. Staples deceived brokerage firms and bond issuers and made at least $6.5 million in profits by lying about the ownership interest in bonds they purchased in joint brokerage accounts that were opened with people facing imminent death, and who were concerned about affording the high cost of a funeral. This father-son duo recruited the terminally ill individuals into their program by offering to pay their funeral expenses if they agreed to open the joint accounts and sign documents that relinquished their ownership rights to the accounts or any assets in them. The SEC’s complaint charged the Staples with violating various provisions of the securities laws and, because public stoning is no longer permitted, sought disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest, financial penalties, and permanent injunctions.

Earlier this year, Benjamin Staples was a witness in the trial of bookie Brett Parker, who was convicted of killing his wife, Tammy Jo Parker, and a business partner, Bryan Capnerhurst.  Staples testified at the trial in which Parker was convicted, that he, Staples, had carried on an intimate affair with Tammy Jo Parker on whom Brett Parker had taken out a sizeable insurance policy, according to a local South Carolina press report.  Staples was also interviewed on NBC’s “Dateline,” which ran a national true-crime television show on Parker’s scheme to kill his wife and Capnerhurst.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in Columbia, S.C., once a joint account was opened and the Staples had sole control, Staples purchased discounted corporate bonds containing a “survivor’s option” that allowed them to redeem the bonds for the full principal amount prior to maturity if a joint owner of the bond dies. Following the death of one of their terminally ill participants, the Staples redeemed the bonds early by citing the survivor’s option to the brokerage firm and misrepresenting that the deceased individual had ownership rights to the bond. Their illicit profit was the difference between the discounted price of the bonds they purchased and the full principal amount they obtained when redeeming the bonds early.

According to the SEC’s complaint, the Staples operated what they called the Estate Assistance Program from early 2008 to mid-2012. They recruited at least 44 individuals into the program and purchased approximately $26.5 million in bonds from at least 35 issuers. The Staples required the terminally ill individuals to sign three documents: an application to open a joint brokerage account with them, an estate assistance agreement, and a participant letter. The latter two documents required the terminally ill participant to relinquish any ownership interest in the assets in the joint account, including the bonds that the Staples later purchased.

The SEC alleges that after a terminally ill participant died, the Staples wrote a letter to the brokerage firm where the joint account was held and asked that the bonds be redeemed under the survivor’s option. In their redemption request letters, the Staples falsely represented that the deceased participant was an “owner” of the bonds. The Staples did not inform the brokerage firms or bond issuers that the deceased program participants had signed the estate assistance agreements and participant letters relinquishing all ownership interest in the bonds.

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Posted in: Investment Advisers
Tagged: Fraud and SEC
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Written by:  Jay B. Gould

On September 17, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced enforcement actions against 23 firms for short selling violations as the agency increases its focus on preventing firms from improperly participating in public stock offerings after selling short those same stocks.  The enforcement actions are being settled by 22 of the 23 firms charged, resulting in more than $14.4 million in monetary sanctions.  

The SEC’s Rule 105 of Regulation M prohibits the short sale of an equity security during a restricted period, which is generally defined as five business days before a public offering – and the purchase of that same security through the offering.  The rule applies regardless of the trader’s intent, and promotes offering prices that are set by natural forces of supply and demand rather than manipulative activity.  The rule is intended to prevent short selling that can reduce offering proceeds received by companies by artificially depressing the market price shortly before the company prices its public offering.

The firms charged in these cases allegedly bought offered shares from an underwriter, broker, or dealer participating in a follow-on public offering after having sold short the same security during the restricted period.   

“The benchmark of an effective enforcement program is zero tolerance for any securities law violations, including violations that do not require manipulative intent,” said Andrew J. Ceresney, Co-Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “Through this new program of streamlined investigations and resolutions of Rule 105 violations, we are sending the clear message that firms must pay the price for violations while also conserving agency resources.” 

The SEC’s National Examination Program simultaneously has issued a risk alert to highlight risks to firms from non-compliance with Rule 105.  The risk alert highlights observations by SEC examiners focusing on Rule 105 compliance issues as well as corrective actions that some firms proactively have taken to remedy Rule 105 concerns.

In a litigated administrative proceeding against G-2 Trading LLC, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement is alleging that the firm violated Rule 105 in connection with transactions in the securities of three companies, resulting in profits of more than $13,000.  The Enforcement Division is seeking disgorgement of the trading profits, prejudgment interest, penalties, and other relief as appropriate and in the public interest.  

The SEC charged the following firms in this series of settled enforcement actions:

  • Blackthorn Investment Group – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $244,378.24, prejudgment interest of $15,829.74, and a penalty of $260,000.00.
  • Claritas Investments Ltd. – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $73,883.00, prejudgment interest of $5,936.67, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
  • Credentia Group – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $4,091.00, prejudgment interest of $113.38, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
  • D.E. Shaw & Co. – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $447,794.00, prejudgment interest of $18,192.37, and a penalty of $201,506.00.
  • Deerfield Management Company – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $1,273,707.00, prejudgment interest of $19,035.00, and a penalty of $609,482.00.
  • Hudson Bay Capital Management – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $665,674.96, prejudgment interest of $11,661.31, and a penalty of $272,118.00.
  • JGP Global Gestão de Recursos – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $2,537,114.00, prejudgment interest of $129,310.00, and a penalty of $514,000.00.
  • M.S. Junior, Swiss Capital Holdings, and Michael A. Stango – Agreed to collectively pay disgorgement of $247,039.00, prejudgment interest of $15,565.77, and a penalty of $165,332.00.
  • Manikay Partners – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $1,657,000.00, prejudgment interest of $214,841.31, and a penalty of $679,950.00.
  • Meru Capital Group – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $262,616.00, prejudgment interest of $4,600.51, and a penalty of $131,296.98.00.
  • Merus Capital Partners – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $8,402.00, prejudgment interest of $63.65, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
  • Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $144,898.00, prejudgment interest of $11,642.90, and a penalty of $68,295.
  • Pan Capital AB – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $424,593.00, prejudgment interest of $17,249.80, and a penalty of $220,655.00.
  • PEAK6 Capital Management – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $58,321.00, prejudgment interest of $8,896.89, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
  • Philadelphia Financial Management of San Francisco – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $137,524.38, prejudgment interest of $16,919.26, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
  • Polo Capital International Gestão de Recursos a/k/a Polo Capital Management – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $191,833.00, prejudgment interest of $14,887.51, and a penalty of $76,000.00.
  • Soundpost Partners – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $45,135.00, prejudgment interest of $3,180.85, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
  • Southpoint Capital Advisors – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $346,568.00, prejudgment interest of $17,695.76, and a penalty of $170,494.00.
  • Talkot Capital – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $17,640.00, prejudgment interest of $1,897.68, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
  • Vollero Beach Capital Partners – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $594,292, prejudgment interest of $55.171, and a penalty of $214,964..
  • War Chest Capital Partners – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $187,036.17, prejudgment interest of $10,533.18, and a penalty of $130,000.00.
  • Western Standard – Agreed to pay disgorgement of $44,980.30, prejudgment interest of $1,827.40, and a penalty of $65,000.00.
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This article was published by The FCPA Report and is reprinted here with permission.

More and more, venture capital firms are investing in start-ups seeking to expand internationally or with nascent cross-border operations in place.  Such investments offer opportunities for lucrative returns but also carry significant anti-corruption risk that VC firms are often ill-equipped to manage.  For many businesses, managing anti-corruption risk is a necessary cost center.  But VC firms are uniquely positioned to use that risk to drive a better deal and gain greater control over management and direction of the business.

The overlapping and increasingly aggressive anti-corruption regimes, including the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act, the anti-bribery laws in China, Germany and the newly enacted law in Brazil, coupled with the heightened risk of corruption in emerging economies, can quickly derail an otherwise strong investment.  Not only are VC firms subject to fines, penalties and reputational harm through the conduct of the start-up, but the conduct itself may have occurred before the VC firm even considered taking a stake.

This article offers an assessment of the opportunities and risks that VC firms should consider, and concludes with four strategies for maximizing returns while limiting anti-corruption risks.

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Written by:  Kimberly V. Mann

The Security and Exchange Commission’s recent enforcement action against Lawrence D. Polizzotto serves as a reminder to all issuers that Regulation FD enforcement is alive and well.

The Polizzotto Case

Polizzotto, the former vice president of investor relations at First Solar, Inc. (and, ironically, a member of the company’s Disclosure Committee, which is responsible for ensuring the company’s compliance with Regulation FD), was found by the SEC to have violated Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Regulation FD by selectively disclosing material nonpublic information to certain analysts and investors before the information was publicly disclosed.  The selective disclosures were made to reassure certain analysts and investors about the company’s prospects of obtaining two loan guarantees and to correct information that was previously disclosed about another loan guarantee. Polizzotto knew that First Solar had not yet issued a press release containing information about the status of the guarantees, but went forward with the selective disclosures in any event to counter adverse research reports about the company and stem substantial declines in the company’s stock price. The SEC also determined that Polizzotto directed a subordinate to make similar selective disclosures in advance of the public announcement. First Solar did not publicly disclose the information about the guarantees until the morning after the selective disclosures were made and the company’s stock price declined by 6% on the news.

Polizzotto’s selective disclosure caused First Solar to violate Section 13(a) and Regulation FD. Because First Solar provided what the SEC described as “extraordinary cooperation,” and because the company demonstrated a culture of compliance, it was not charged with any violations. The SEC’s order can be found at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70337.pdf.

Regulation FD Basics

  • Under Regulation FD, an issuer or any person acting on its behalf that intentionally discloses material nonpublic information to (i) broker-dealers or their associated persons, (ii) investment advisers or their associated persons,
    (iii) investment companies or entities such as hedge funds that would be investment companies but for their reliance on exceptions available under Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 or their affiliated persons or (iv) any of the holders of the issuer’s securities, where it is foreseeable that the recipient of the information would purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis of the information disclosed is required to make simultaneous public disclosure of the information. Disclosure is intentional if the disclosing person knows or is reckless in not knowing that the information being disclosed is material and nonpublic.
  • If selective disclosure is unintentional, public disclosure is required to be made promptly following the selective disclosure. Public disclosure is made promptly by a fund if it is made as soon as reasonably practicable after a senior official of the fund or of the fund’s investment adviser learns that there has been unintentional disclosure of material nonpublic information. In no event will public disclosure be deemed promptly made if it is made after the later of (i) 24 hours after the senior official learns of the unintentional disclosure and
    (ii) commencement of trading on the New York Stock Exchange on the trading day after the senior official learns of the unintentional disclosure.
  • In the context of an investment fund, the term “issuer” means a closed-end fund that (i) has a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act (for example, a fund that has more than $10 million in assets and at least 2000 record holders of any class of its equity securities, or has at least 500 record holders of such securities that are not accredited investors) or (ii) is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Open-end and other types of investment companies are not issuers for purposes of Regulation FD. Foreign private issuers also are not subject to Regulation FD.
  • A “person acting on behalf of a closed-end fund” would include a senior official of the fund or of the fund’s investment adviser or any other officer, employee or agent of the fund that regularly communicates with any person to whom selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is prohibited. An agent of a closed-end fund would include a director, officer or employee of the fund’s adviser or another service provider that is acting as an agent of the fund.
  • The requirements of Regulation FD do not apply to disclosures made by a fund  (i) to its attorneys or any other person that owes a duty of trust or confidence to the fund, (ii) to any person that is subject to an obligation to keep the disclosed information confidential, or (iii) in connection with most primary registered offerings of securities under the Securities Act of 1933. The requirements of Regulation FD apply to disclosures made in connection with unregistered private offerings; however, information may be disclosed privately to select recipients if the recipients are bound by a confidentiality agreement.
  • Public disclosure may be made by way of public filings under the Exchange Act, such as on Form 8-K, or by using any other method reasonably designed to provide broad, nonexclusionary public distribution (such as press releases through wire services with wide circulation, news conferences that are open to the public or publication on the issuer’s website).  In 2008, the SEC issued guidance on public disclosure through company websites, which can be found at   http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2008/34-58288.pdf.
  • On April 2, 2013, the SEC issued guidance indicating that social media outlets are permitted to be used to disseminate material information publicly in compliance with Regulation FD. The principles outlined in the 2008 guidance on company websites should be used to determine whether a particular social media outlet is an appropriate channel of distribution for purposes of Regulation FD. In order to use a company website or social media to disclose information publicly, investors must be notified of the specific website or social media channel to be used to provide information to the public. The SEC’s investigative report on social media and Regulation FD can be found at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-69279.pdf.

Regulation FD Compliance Measures 

The following is a partial list of measures that funds and their advisers might implement to assist with Regulation FD compliance.

  • Review existing Regulation FD policies with counsel and update them from time to time as appropriate. Indicate in the Regulation FD compliance policy the names and titles of those persons that are authorized to speak to investors on behalf of the fund.
    • Establish procedures for responding to inquiries from investors and market professionals.
    • Develop a definition of “material information” and incorporate it in the Regulation FD policy.
    • Establish procedures for handling one-on-one discussions with investors and market professionals.
    • Develop policies and procedures for the use of a website or social media to disseminate information to the public.
    • Maintain records of prior disclosures of material information.
  • Conduct periodic Regulation FD training for persons acting on behalf of the fund.
  • Conduct periodic Regulation FD compliance audits.
  • Establish accountability for Regulation FD compliance at top management levels.

Establishing effective policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with Section 13(a) and Regulation FD may, in addition to reducing the risk of violations, have the effect of reducing the risk of liability in the event a violation occurs.

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The 4th Annual Excellence In Investing: San Francisco, in partnership with The Sohn Conference Foundation, will be held on October 23, 2013 at The Bentley Reserve.   Excellence In Investing: San Francisco is the premiere Bay Area investor conference benefiting local and national education and other children’s causes.  

For more information and to register, please visit www.excellencesf.org or click here.

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Posted in: Events
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Written by:  Jay B. Gould and Jessica Brown

In response to the devastating effect of Hurricane Sandy which temporarily crippled U.S. equity and options markets in October 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) issued a Risk Alert on business continuity and disaster recovery planning for investment advisers. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the SEC reviewed the business continuity and disaster recovery plans of approximately 40 advisers who were affected by the storm “to assess their preparedness for and reaction to the storm.”

On August 16, 2013, a joint advisory was issued by OCIE, the CFTC’s Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority on business continuity and disaster recovery planning for a wide array of firms. The Risk Alert focuses exclusively on investment advisers and encourages advisers to review their business continuity plans in light of OCIE’s findings.  

The Risk Alert highlights the notable practices and weakness identified in the business continuity and disaster recovery plans and suggests improvements advisers could make to their plans in the following areas:

  • Preparation for widespread disruption
  • Planning for alternative locations
  • Preparedness of key vendors
  • Telecommunications services and technology
  • Communication plans
  • Reviewing and testing
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Written by: Jay B. Gould

On September 23, 2013, the JOBS Act rules that roll back the 80 year old ban on the use of general advertising and public solicitation by issuers of unregistered securities will be a reality. At least it will be a reality for fund managers that do not rely on an exemption from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Private funds managers will decide over time whether they would like to avail themselves of the new rules, which will allow them to post performance numbers on their websites, talk openly about their funds on CNBC and Bloomberg, sponsor NASCAR events, and just generally be more open and transparent about their businesses. The responsibilities associated with these new rights are the requirements that the fund manager verify the accredited status of each investor, refrain from committing financial fraud, and file a revised Form D to indicate that the fund is following the new rules. Whether to use these new rules will be a tough call for many fund managers as they consider whether greater transparency provides a benefit for their specific business model. Hedge funds have often avoided the glare of public scrutiny, but the trade-off of building a more recognizable brand and more easily reaching potential investors could provide motivation for some fund managers to give these new rules a try.

But what happens if a fund manager is initially enamored of the new rules and decides to advertise generally, but later changes his mind? Can a fund manager go back to the old “pre-existing, substantial relationship” days, and how do you do that once the fund has been “generally offered” to the public? This could happen for any number of reasons. Perhaps the most prevalent would be that the manager reaches capacity in the fund in either assets, such as a quant fund, or investor slots, which would more likely be the case for a fund that relies on Section 3(c)(1) for its exemption from investment company registration. A fund manager in one of these situations may have originally liked the idea of generally advertising, but subsequently finds public solicitation of limited utility and not worth the potential added scrutiny from regulators and market participants.

If a fund commences an offering pursuant to Rule 506(c) using general solicitation, and later wants to go back and use the old rules, (i.e., rule 506(b)), the issue is one of integration. Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation; accordingly, the only way to stop using the public offering rules once a fund manager has done so, would be to wait a period of time so the rule 506(c) offering is not integrated with the rule 506(b) offering. Rule 502(a) of Regulation D provides for a safe harbor from integration so long as the selling effort of the earlier offering ceases for six months, and the fund does not commence a subsequent offering for 6 months after completion of the earlier offering. Therefore, a fund manager would need to cease the offering, file the Form D to indicate that the offering is over, and wait six months before commencing the “private” offering. A new Form D would need to be filed for the private offering under Rule 506(b) once that offering commences.

There is another way whereby fund managers could go straight from the public offering to the private offering without the six month cooling off period. It is possible that a fund manager could use the five factor test safe harbor of Rule 502(a) to avoid integration and commence a new private offering immediately. For most hedge fund managers, this would be fairly tough test to meet. The five factors that a fund would need to consider are as follows:

(a) Whether the sales are part of a single plan of financing;
(b) Whether the sales involve issuance of the same class of securities;
(c) Whether the sales have been made at or about the same time;
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is being received; and
(e) Whether the sales are made for the same general purpose.

In order to meet the requirements of the five factor test, the fund seeking to avoid integration would need to offer a different class of shares/interests, for a different investment purposes, with different terms and conditions. For many hedge fund managers, this will be a difficult standard to meet. So the bottom line here appears to be that you can put Humpty Dumpty back together again, he will just need six months in intensive care.

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Written by:  Jessica Brown

On July 25, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) Division of Investment Management released its first annual report to Congress, as required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), regarding how it used private fund data collected from investment advisers on Form PF. Dodd-Frank gave the SEC authority to require registered investment advisers to file reports and maintain records regarding the funds they advise. The SEC adopted Form PF in 2011 as the mechanism through which registered advisers must provide this information to the SEC.

Although it acknowledges that the intent of the Dodd-Frank provision was to provide data for the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to assess systemic risk, the SEC is using the data to support its own regulatory programs as well.  

In this first report to Congress, the SEC indicated that is has been focused on the Form PF electronic filing system, resolving technical issues with security and data collection, guiding Form PF filers through the new form and system, establishing protocols for internal access and protection of data, and providing the FSOC with access to the data. Various divisions of the SEC have begun to use the Form PF data to assist with monitoring, identifying and examining investment advisers and private funds. The SEC also plans to provide non-proprietary Form PF data about large hedge funds to the International Organization of Securities Commission for its report on the global hedge fund market.

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Written by:  Kimberly Mann

Private investment fund structures frequently include one or more vehicles that are organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands is a preferred jurisdiction because there is no tax on income, profits or capital gains, nor is there withholding tax. In addition, at the time of its formation, an entity may purchase a tax exemption certificate which will preserve its tax-free status for several years. Formation in the Cayman Islands is relatively efficient and inexpensive and a number of different types of business organizational structures that offer limited liability for investors may be used. Advisors to Cayman funds also may avoid licensing requirements if they fall within an available exemption.

Cayman entities likely will become even more attractive to fund managers, sponsors and investors as a result of recent changes to Cayman law pertaining to fiduciary duties, third party beneficiaries of indemnification provisions, the manner in which fund documents may be executed, the use of foreign partnerships as general partners of Cayman limited partnerships and the adoption of a limited liability company statute, all of which help to bring Cayman law in line with Delaware law. However, fund managers are advised to remember important anti-money laundering obligations that apply to investment funds under Cayman law.

Anti-money Laundering Requirements

Notwithstanding the recent liberalization of certain laws and the absence of registration or licensing requirements in many cases, managers of Cayman vehicles are subject to strict anti-money laundering compliance requirements under the Proceeds of Crime Law (“PCL”) and the Money Laundering Regulations promulgated under the PCL. In addition, the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority Guidance Notes on Prevention and Detection of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Cayman Islands (“Guidance Notes”) provide important guidelines for anti-money laundering compliance. Under the Cayman anti-money laundering regime, fund managers must
(i) establish client identification procedures, (ii) implement suspicious transaction reporting procedures, (iii) maintain know-your-client information and suspicious transaction records, (iv) develop internal controls, policies and procedures that are appropriate to prevent money laundering, (v) implement an anti-money laundering training program for staff members and (vi) designate a compliance officer at the management level with the requisite skills and experience to manage the compliance program and report to the board of directors or its equivalent.

The purpose of the Guidance Notes is to assist funds and other financial services providers to comply with applicable Cayman Islands Money Laundering Regulations. The Guidance Notes describe the types of documentation that should be used as evidence of the identity of investors and their beneficial owners and signatories. The type of documentation required depends, in large measure, upon the nature of the investor or beneficial owner. For example, identification documents for natural persons would include a current valid passport, a recent utility bill and a reference letter from a lawyer, accountant or other respected professional. Appropriate documentation for a corporate investor would include a certificate of incorporation, a copy of recent financial statements of the company, identification evidence of each of the principal beneficial owners holding a 10% or greater interest in the company or otherwise exercising control over the company and copies of the resolutions of the board of directors authorizing the investment in the fund. If copies of identifying documents are submitted, they should be certified by a lawyer, accountant, notary public, member of the judiciary or other suitable certifier. The Guidance Notes are not required to be followed slavishly; rather, the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority expects financial services providers to exercise prudent judgment and take the Guidance Notes into account when devising their anti-money laundering policies and procedures.

A Pragmatic Approach – Using an Intermediary

Under the Money Laundering Regulations, evidence of identity is satisfactory if it is reasonably capable of establishing that the investor is who it claims to be. There are circumstances under which it may be duplicative, onerous or unhelpful for a fund manager to obtain and verify identification evidence about a prospective investor. In those cases, it may be appropriate to rely on the due diligence of a third party intermediary that will serve as an “eligible introducer.” An eligible introducer is, among other things, (i) a lawyer or certified or chartered accountant or firm of lawyers or certified or chartered accountants, conducting business in a country with legislation equivalent to the Money Laundering Regulations, (ii) a member of a professional body in a country listed in Schedule 3 of the Money Laundering Regulations that is subject to disciplinary action for failure to comply with guidelines similar to the Guidance Notes or (iii) a financial institution in a country listed in Schedule 3 of the Money Laundering Regulations that has regulations equivalent to the Money Laundering Regulations, if the financial institution is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory authority outside the Cayman Islands that is the functional equivalent of the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority. Use of an eligible introducer may be pragmatic in order to create efficiencies in cases where the introducer would have already conducted procedures to verify the identity of the prospective investor. An eligible introducer must ensure that its documentation is accurate and up-to-date. The nature of the relationship between the introducer and the fund manager and between the introducer and the prospective investor, as well as the bona fides of the introducer, will determine whether it is appropriate to use the introducer as an intermediary for anti-money laundering purposes.

Required Due Diligence on the Intermediary

It is important for a fund manager to keep in mind that it is responsible for ensuring that the procedures utilized by the introducer are substantially in accordance with the Guidance Notes and that documentary evidence of the introducer upon which the manager will rely is satisfactory. Evidence is satisfactory if it complies with the requirements of the anti-money laundering regime of the country from which the introduction is made. Fund managers or administrators typically require an eligible introducer to provide a comfort letter or eligible introducer form providing assurances that (i) the intermediary qualifies as an eligible introducer, (ii) the introducer’s due diligence procedures are satisfactory, (iii) the introducer has information that clearly establishes the identity of the investor or the investor’s beneficial owner, (iv) the introducer will make available upon request copies of documentation that it has obtained regarding the identity of the prospective investor or the prospective investor’s beneficial owner and (v) due diligence and other identification documentation will be retained by the introducer for the time period required by the regulations to which the introducer is subject. In addition to the comfort letter or eligible introducer form, the fund manager should obtain independent evidence of the eligibility of the introducer, such as confirmation that the introducer is a regulated entity or a member in good standing of a professional body. It is also advisable to test, from time to time, the introducer’s ability to furnish requested identifying documentation promptly. If it turns out that reliance should not have been placed on an introducer, the fund manager must carry out its own due diligence procedures on the prospective investor or beneficial owner.

Exemptions for Certain Types of Investors

Documentary evidence of identity is not required under all circumstances. For example, evidence of identity is not typically required where the investor is a governmental entity, agency of government or a statutory body. In addition, financial institutions in countries listed in Schedule 3 of the Money Laundering Regulations, companies with securities that are listed on exchanges or other markets approved by the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority and pension funds are examples of entities for which exemptions exist.  For pension funds, evidence that the investor is a pension fund may consist of a copy of a certificate of registration or an order, approval or regulation of a governmental, regulatory or fiscal authority in the jurisdiction in which the pension fund was established. In the absence of any such evidence, the fund manager should obtain the names and addresses of the trustees or other persons authorized to make investment decisions on behalf of the pension fund.

Summary

The failure to take the Guidance Notes into account could result in sanctions under Cayman law. The Guidance Notes make clear that fund managers should consider money laundering and terrorist financing prevention as part of their risk management strategies and not as a stand-alone requirement. Policies should be tailored to the nature and scope of the fund’s business. Prior to accepting subscribers, a fund manager or its administrator should ensure that documentary evidence of the identity of each prospective investor has been provided and reviewed. Where there are questions, or if insufficient information has been provided by a prospective investor, the manager or administrator should follow up until the prospective investor and its beneficial owners have been adequately identified and determined to be suitable from an anti-money laundering perspective. Subscription materials should be reviewed and modified, if necessary, to include anti-money laundering attestations and documentary requests. Fund managers that are U.S. persons also should check the names of prospective investors and their beneficial owners to determine whether they are on the list of specially designated nationals published by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.  Managers that are registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as investment advisors likely have an anti-money laundering system in place that meets the requirements of the Guidance Notes. Managers that are not registered investment advisors may not have such policies and procedures in place and may benefit from assistance from counsel or a consultant in establishing and maintaining a satisfactory system.