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By William M. Sullivan, Jr. and Jay B. Gould

Under the Second Circuit’s new ruling, prosecutors have two large hurdles they must clear to convict under securities laws. First, they must prove that a defendant knew that the source of inside information disclosed tips in exchange for a personal benefit. Second, the definition of “personal benefit” is tightened to something more akin to a quid pro quo exchange.

For years, insider trading cases have been slam dunks for federal prosecutors. The United States Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York had compiled a remarkable streak of more than eighty insider trading convictions over the past five years. But that record has evaporated thanks to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Newman, in which the Second Circuit concluded that the district court’s jury instructions were improper and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

The Second Circuit relied upon a thirty year old Supreme Court opinion, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), and highlighted the “doctrinal novelty” of many of the government’s recent successful insider trading prosecutions in failing to follow Dirks. Accordingly, the Court overturned insider trading convictions for Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson because the defendants did not know they were trading on confidential information received from insiders in violation of those insiders’ fiduciary duties. More broadly, however, the Court laid down two new standards in tipping liability cases, both likely to frustrate prosecutors for years to come.

Tougher Disclosure Requirements

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission rules 10b-5 and 10b5-1 generally prohibit trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, more conventionally known as insider trading. In addition, federal law also prohibits an individual (the “tipper”) from disclosing private information to an outside person (the “tippee”), if the tippee then trades on the basis of this private information. This disclosure—a breach of one’s fiduciary duty—is known as tipping liability. As with most crimes, tipping liability requires scienter, a mental state that demonstrates intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In these cases, the government must show that the defendant acted willfully—i.e., with the realization that what he was doing was a wrongful act under the securities laws.

Until last week, willfulness had been fairly easy to show, and that was one of the principal reasons for the government’s string of successes. Prosecutors only had to prove that the defendants traded on confidential information that they knew had been disclosed through a breach of confidentiality. In Newman, however, the Second Circuit rejected this position outright. The Court held that a tippee can only be convicted if the government can prove that he knew that the insider disclosed confidential information in exchange for a personal benefit, and one that is “consequential” and potentially pecuniary.

This distinction may seem minor, but its impact is enormous. The government now must prove—beyond a reasonable doubt, no less—that a defendant affirmatively knew about a personal benefit to the source of the confidential information. From the prosecution’s perspective, this is a massively challenging prospect.

Tightened “Personal Benefit” Standards

The Second Circuit also clarified the definition of “personal benefit” in the tipping liability context. Previously, the Court had embraced a very broad definition of the term—so broad, in fact, that the government argued that a tip in exchange for “mere friendship” or “career advice” could expose a trader to tipping liability.

The Court retreated from this position and narrowed its standard. Now, to constitute a personal benefit, the prosecution must show an exchange “that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” —in other words, something akin to a quid pro quo relationship. This, too, complicates a prosecution’s case significantly.

Implications of the Ruling

What effect will this ruling have moving forward? Of course, one effect is obvious from the start: prosecutors are going to have a much more difficult time proving tipping liability. But as with many new appellate cases, it may take some time to see how this rule shakes out on the ground in the trial courts. Here are a few things to keep in mind over the next few months and years.

  • This ruling may cause some immediate fallout. For example, there are currently several similar cases in New York that are pending for trial or appeal, and these may now result in acquittals or vacated convictions. In fact, some defendants who previously took guilty pleas in cooperation with Newman and Chiasson’s case are considering withdrawing their pleas in light of this decision. Moving forward, look to see the SEC and potential defendants adjusting their behavior and strategies in light of this ruling. In fact, just this week, a New York Federal Judge expressed strong reservations about whether guilty pleas entered by four defendants in an insider trader case related to a $1.2 billion IBM Corp. acquisition in 2009 should remain in light of Newman.
  • This is also welcome news for tippees who did not interact directly with the source of the inside information. Although the source of the leak may still be prosecuted as usual, this ruling may shield a more remote party from an indictment. As the Newman court noted, the government’s recent insider trading wins have been “increasingly targeted at remote tippees many levels removed from corporate insiders.” Now, without clear evidence that the insider received a quantifiable benefit and that the tippee was aware of such benefit for providing the information, cases against such “remote tippees” will be tremendously more difficult to prove.
  • But, caution should still reign where tippees deal more directly with tippers. The tippees in this case were as many as three or four steps removed from the tippers. It is not difficult to imagine the Court coming out the other way if Newman and Chiasson had been dealing with the tippers themselves.
  • One enormous question mark is to what extent the standards expressed in this case will affect the SEC’s civil enforcement suits. We will have to wait and see, but traders should still use caution. Because civil suits require a substantially lower burden of proof and lesser standard of intent compared to criminal cases, it is possible that these new rules may offer little protection from a civil suit. Additionally, SEC attorneys will probably emphasize this distinction to courts in an attempt to distinguish their enforcement suits from Newman and Chiasson’s criminal case, but whether this tactic is effective remains to be seen.
  • Although the Court refined the meaning of a personal benefit, the definition is still purposefully flexible. This case tells us that abstract psychic benefits—friendship, business advice, church relationships—are not enough, but what about anything just short of exchanging money, favors, or goods? We don’t yet know, and for that reason clients should exercise care.
If you have any questions about the content of this alert,   please contact the Pillsbury attorney with whom you regularly work, or the   authors below.
Jay B. Gould (bio)San Francisco

+1.415.983.1226

jay.gould@pillsburylaw.com

 William M. Sullivan (bio)Washington, DC

+1.202.663.8027

wsullivan@pillsburylaw.com

 

The authors wish to thank Robert Boyd for his valuable assistance with this client alert.

 

About Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
Pillsbury is a full-service law firm with an industry focus on energy & natural resources, financial services including financial institutions, real estate & construction, and technology. Based in the world’s major financial, technology and energy centers, Pillsbury counsels clients on global business, regulatory and litigation matters. We work in multidisciplinary teams that allow us to understand our clients’ objectives, anticipate trends, and bring a 360-degree perspective to complex business and legal issues—helping clients to take greater advantage of new opportunities, meet and exceed their objectives, and better mitigate risk. This collaborative work style helps produce the results our clients seek.

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The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced that on December 16, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered a Consent Order for permanent injunction against AlphaMetrix, LLC (AlphaMetrix), a Chicago-based Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA), and its parent company AlphaMetrix Group, LLC (AlphaMetrix Group). The Order requires AlphaMetrix to pay restitution of $2.8 million and a civil monetary penalty of $2.8 million and requires AlphaMetrix Group to pay disgorgement of $2.8 million. The Order also prohibits AlphaMetrix from further violating anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), as charged.

The Order stems from CFTC charges that AlphaMetrix failed to pay at least $2.8 million in rebates owed to some of its commodity pool participants by investing the rebate funds in the pools and instead transferred the funds to its parent company, which had no entitlement to the funds. Nevertheless, AlphaMetrix sent these pool participants account statements that included the rebate funds as if they had been reinvested in the pools, even though they were not (see CFTC Press Release 6767-13, November 6, 2013).

A civil action filed by the court-appointed receiver remains pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In that action, the receiver seeks to recover funds from former officers of AlphaMetrix and AlphaMetrix Group.

The CFTC cautions victims that restitution orders may not result in the recovery of money lost because the wrongdoers may not have sufficient funds or assets.

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With interest rates and credit spreads near historic lows and equity valuation above historical averages, many people are concerned that the Federal Reserve, by artificially keeping rates low, has created a 2007 type asset bubble in the capital markets where many securities are priced to perfection. What happens to the financial markets when the Fed begins to raise interest rates or there is some other economic shock to the financial system, and what impact will this have on the hedge fund industry? We recently saw a glimpse of this from mid-September to mid-October when we experienced a slight tremor in the capital markets which saw asset prices decline and volatility spike. This was followed by an onslaught of negative articles from the mainstream media relative to the hedge fund industry.

Agecroft Partners believes there is a low probability of another 2008 type market selloff in the near future. However, if it were to occur, the outcome in the hedge fund industry would be very different than what was experienced in 2008. The hedge fund industry is structurally much more stable today than in 2008. As describe below, such stability would result in significantly less redemptions and an avoidance of a complete seizing of inflows.

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On November 25, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) brought charges against a Swiss-based bank that should serve as notice to all non-U.S. banks that maintain relationships with clients who have moved to the U.S., as well as U.S.-based banks that provide services to clients who have relocated to other countries.  The SEC found that HSBC’s Swiss-based private banking arm violated U.S. securities laws by providing investment advisory and brokerage services to U.S. clients without being properly registered as either an investment adviser or a broker-dealer.  HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) agreed to admit wrongdoing and pay $12.5 million to settle the SEC’s charges in a combination of disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and penalties.

How often do financial institutions, foreign or U.S., put themselves in the position of willfully violating the securities and banking laws of other countries?  Pretty routinely, as it turns out.  By way of example, suppose you are a citizen of a European Union country with a local banking relationship.  You work for a large multi-national company that offers you a promotion, but that new job is in New York.  Not one to decline an opportunity, off you go to the Center of the Universe.  You open a new bank account at a local New York bank, but you maintain your European bank relationship because you have a consolidated banking, investment advisory and brokerage relationship there that has worked quite well for you.  The relationship manager at your European bank certainly does not want to give up the revenue stream from your lucrative relationship, particularly now that you are making so much more money and you are willing to purchase and sell stocks more frequently.  Multiply this scenario several times over and before you know it, this certain European bank is routinely providing banking, investment advisory, and brokerage services to U.S. residents without being properly registered to do so.

This same scenario can and often does play out in reverse.  A U.S. citizen moves to a foreign country and maintains his banking, investment advisory and/or brokerage relationships with a financial institution that is not qualified to do business in the client’s new country of residence and before you know it, the U.S. financial institution is in violation of the laws of the country in which its client now resides.  And, not to gratuitously pick on any particular jurisdiction, the provision of such services in some countries pourrait être criminelle.

In the case of HSBC, the SEC found that HSBC Private Bank and its predecessors began providing cross-border advisory and brokerage services in the U.S. more than 10 years ago on behalf of at least 368 U.S. client accounts and collected fees totaling approximately $5.7 million.  HSBC relationship managers traveled to the U.S. on at least 40 occasions to solicit clients, provide investment advice, and induce securities transactions.  These relationship managers were not registered in the U.S. as investment adviser representatives or licensed brokers, nor were they affiliated with a registered investment adviser or broker-dealer (or “chaperoned” by a registered U.S. broker-dealer).  The relationship managers also communicated directly with clients in the U.S. through overseas mail and e-mails.  In 2010, HSBC Private Bank decided to exit the U.S. cross-border business, and nearly all of its U.S. client accounts were closed or transferred by the end of 2011.

According to the SEC’s order, HSBC Private Bank understood there was a risk of violating U.S. securities laws by providing unregistered investment advisory and brokerage services to U.S. clients, and the firm undertook certain compliance initiatives in an effort to manage and mitigate the risk.  The firm created a dedicated North American desk to consolidate U.S. client accounts among a smaller number of relationship managers and service them in a compliant manner that would not violate U.S. registration requirements.  However, certain relationship managers were reluctant to lose clients by transferring them to the North American desk and stalled the process or ignored it altogether.  HSBC Private Bank’s internal review revealed multiple occasions when U.S. accounts that were expected to be closed under certain compliance initiatives remained open.  HSBC Private Bank admitted to the SEC’s findings in the administrative order, acknowledged that its conduct violated U.S. securities laws, and accepted a censure and a cease-and-desist order.

Foreign financial institutions, even those that have U.S. affiliates that are properly registered and regulated as banks, investment advisers, or broker-dealers should undertake a review of their client accounts to determine whether they are providing services that are in violation of applicable law.  It is possible, perhaps even likely, that even if a non-U.S. financial institution has properly registered U.S. entities, services are being provided to certain clients outside of those entities as a result of historical relationships.  U.S. banks should also determine whether they are providing financial services to relocated clients in countries that would either prohibit such services or require some form of notification or registration.  A failure to abide by the laws of non-U.S. countries could also place a U.S. institution in the position of violating certain U.S. laws that require diligence of and compliance with the laws of other countries.

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This is a reminder that the 2015 IARD account renewal obligation for investment advisers (including exempt reporting advisers) starts this November.  An investment adviser must ensure that its IARD account is adequately funded to cover payment of all applicable registration renewal fees and notice filing fees.

Key Dates in the Renewal Process:

November 10, 2014 – Preliminary Renewal Statements which list advisers’ renewal fee amount are available for printing through the IARD system.

December 12, 2014 – Deadline for full payment of Preliminary Renewal Statements.  In order for the payment to be posted to its IARD Renewal account by the December 12 deadline, an investment adviser should submit its preliminary renewal fee to FINRA through the IARD system by December 10, 2014.

December 28, 2014 – January 1, 2015 – IARD system shut down.  The system is unavailable during this period.

January 2, 2015 – Final Renewal Statements are available for printing.  Any additional fees that were not included in the Preliminary Renewal Statements will show in the Final Renewal Statements.

January 16, 2015 – Deadline for full payment of Final Renewal Statements.

For more information about the 2015 IARD Account Renewal Program including information on IARD’s Renewal Payment Options and Addresses, please visit http://www.iard.com/renewals.asp

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On October 29, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced an administrative enforcement action against an investment advisory firm and three top officials for violating rule 206(4)-2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), the “custody rule,” that requires firms to follow certain procedures when they control or have (or are deemed to have) access to client money or securities.  This enforcement action follows closely on the heels of statements by SEC officials indicating that violations of the custody rule were a recurring theme during the “presence exams” of private equity fund advisers and other first time investment adviser registrants that have been conducted by the SEC staff over the last year and a half.

Advisory firms with custody of private fund assets can comply with the custody rule by distributing audited financial statements to fund investors within 120 days of the end of the fiscal year.  This provides investors with regular independent verification of their assets as a safeguard against misuse or theft.  The SEC’s Enforcement Division alleges that Sands Brothers Asset Management LLC has been repeatedly late in providing investors with audited financial statements of its private funds, and the firm’s co-founders along with its chief compliance officer and chief operating officer were responsible for the firm’s failures to comply with the custody rule.  As investment adviser registrants are painfully aware, chief compliance officers have personal liability for compliance failures under Advisers Act rule 206(4)-7.  This particular enforcement action was brought pursuant to section 203(f) of and rule 206(4)-2 under the Advisers Act.  It remains to be seen whether the SEC will bring a separate action against the Sands Brothers’ chief compliance officer under rule 206(4)-7.

Also nervously awaiting any further action by the SEC would be the accountants and lawyers that advised the Sands Brothers and their hedge funds with respect to the custody matter.  The accounting firm or firms that conducted the audit of the Sands Brothers hedge funds likely knew that the funds did not meet the requirements of the custody rule.  It is less certain whether the external lawyers knew or should have known about these violations.  However, if either the accountants or lawyers knew of these violations and advised that they were only technical in nature and immaterial or  unimportant, the SEC could take separate administrative action pursuant to SEC rule 102(e) to bar any such party from practicing before the SEC.  We previously wrote about the more aggressive posture that the SEC signaled with respect to service providers, specifically lawyers that assist or “aid and abet” violations of the securities laws.  The SEC has a fairly high standard to meet when bringing these types of cases, but that has not deterred the regulator from aggressively pursuing more accountants and lawyers in recent months.

According to the SEC’s order instituting the administrative proceeding, Sands Brothers was at least 40 days late in distributing audited financial statements to investors in 10 private funds for fiscal year 2010.  The next year, audited financial statements for those same funds were delivered anywhere from six months to eight months late.  The same materials for fiscal year 2012 were distributed to investors approximately three months late.  According to the SEC’s order, Sands Brothers and the two co-founders were previously sanctioned by the SEC in 2010 for custody rule violations.

If you have been late on the delivery of your audited financial statements and have not availed yourself of the “surprise audit” provision of the custody rule, or if you manage “side car” funds that have never been audited, you should immediately get in touch with your Pillsbury attorney contact.

 

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Replacing Circular 75, Circular 37 simplifies the SAFE registration process for Chinese residents seeking offshore investments and financings, and it liberalizes cross-border capital outflow by Chinese residents. In addition, Circular 37 also permits registration of equity incentive plans of non-listed Special Purpose Vehicles.

In July 2014, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the People’s Republic of China released the Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Administration of Foreign Exchange Involved in Offshore Investment, Financing and Round-Trip Investment Conducted by Domestic Residents Through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) (Circular Hui Fa [2014] No. 37) (Circular 37). Circular 37 superseded Circular 75 (Circular Hui Fa [2005] No. 75), which regulated the same subject matter and was issued by SAFE almost ten years ago.

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On September 22, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) charged private equity fund adviser, Lincolnshire Management, Inc. (“Lincolnshire”), with misallocating expenses shared between two portfolio companies. Lincolnshire integrated two portfolio companies that were each owned by a different Lincolnshire private equity fund. Lincolnshire owed a fiduciary duty to each fund and such fiduciary duty was breached when Lincolnshire would charge one portfolio company more than its fair share for expenses benefiting both portfolio companies.

Lincolnshire was aware of the complexity involved in sharing expenses and did have an expense allocation policy in place, though it was not in writing. The instances that resulted in a breach of Lincolnshire’s fiduciary duty were those in which the verbal expense allocation policy was not followed. The SEC also found, with respect to the integration of the portfolio companies, that Lincolnshire did not have sufficient written policies and procedures in place to prevent violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Adviser’s Act”). Lincolnshire agreed to a settlement with the SEC in excess of $2.3 million.

It is interesting to note that, while the SEC announced several months ago it had conducted presence exams and found many issues in private equity managers, Lincolnshire was not one of the companies subject to a presence exam. Private equity managers who have not had a presence exam should not assume they are unlikely to be examined outside of the presence exam protocol. This enforcement action reinforces the requirement that private equity fund advisers are required to have policies and procedures in place that are designed to prevent violations of the Adviser’s Act and other securities laws. More importantly, once in place, such policies and procedures must be monitored by the chief compliance officer and observed by all “covered persons.”

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This article was originally published in The Wall Street Journal‘s CIO Journal on September 11, 2014.

Today as companies increasingly realize the value of strong cybersecurity, those CIOs who successfully implement an effective cybersecurity system should be viewed as a critical part of the revenue generation effort. An effective CIO who maintains a robust cyber risk management program will not only help ensure efficient operations, but will also play a role in crossing cybersecurity thresholds established by customers that would otherwise serve as a barrier to entry.

The shift from regarding cybersecurity–and the people responsible for implementing it–as a “tax,” to something that can further the business comes after some hard lessons. The value of intellectual property stolen by cyber espionage is measured today in billions of dollars. Meanwhile, operational disruptions caused by other malicious cyber events have managed to cripple productivity and harm relationships with customers.

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On September 16, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced the latest sanctions in a continuing enforcement initiative against certain hedge fund advisers and private equity firms that have participated in an offering of a stock after short selling it during a restricted period in contravention of SEC rules.

The SEC last year announced the initiative to enhance enforcement of Rule 105 of Regulation M, which is designed to preserve the independent pricing mechanisms of the securities markets and prevent stock price manipulation.  Rule 105 typically prohibits firms or individuals from short selling a stock within five business days of participating in an offering for that same stock.  Such dual activity typically results in illicit profits for the firms or individuals while reducing the offering proceeds for a company by artificially depressing the market price shortly before the company prices the stock.

The SEC’s investigations targeted 19 firms and one individual trader in the latest cases engaged in short selling of particular stocks shortly before they bought shares from an underwriter, broker, or dealer participating in a follow-on public offering.  Each firm and the individual trader have agreed to settle the SEC’s charges and pay a combined total of more than $9 million in disgorgement, interest, and penalties.

Pursuant to this enforcement initiative, the SEC’s Enforcement Division works closely with FINRA and the SEC’s National Exam Program to identify potential violations of Rule 105.  Enforcement staff seeks trading data and certain other relevant information from traders and expedites these cases by using uniform methodologies for determining trading profits and deciding appropriate penalties.

This latest round of administrative proceedings for Rule 105 violations included the following organizations with the monetary sanctions as indicated below:

  • Advent Capital Management – The New York-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $75,292, prejudgment interest of $3,836.36, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • Antipodean Advisors – The New York-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $27,970, prejudgment interest of $702.83, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • BlackRock Institutional Trust Company – The California-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $1,122,400, prejudgment interest of $22,471.13, and a penalty of $530,479.
  • East Side Holdings II – The New Jersey-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $26,613, prejudgment interest of $397.38, and a penalty of $130,000.
  • Explorador Capital Management – The Brazil-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $83,722, prejudgment interest of $6,936.65, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • Formula Growth – The Canada-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $42,488, prejudgment interest of $4,255.15, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • Great Point Partners – The Connecticut-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $43,068, prejudgment interest of $1,529.13, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • Indaba Capital Management – The California-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $194,797, prejudgment interest of $11,990.79, and a penalty of $97,398.59.
  • Ironman Capital Management – The Texas-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $21,844, prejudgment interest of $382.66, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • James C. Parsons – An individual trader who lives in New York City agreed to pay disgorgement of $135,531, prejudgment interest of $3,063.90, and a penalty of $67,765.72.
  • Midwood Capital Management – The Massachusetts-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $72,699, prejudgment interest of $5,248.19, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • Nob Hill Capital Management – The California-based firm made sworn statements to the Commission attesting to a financial condition that makes it unable to pay any penalty.
  • RA Capital Management – The Massachusetts-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $2,646,395.21, prejudgment interest of $73,394.16, and a penalty of $904,570.84.
  • Rockwood Investment Management (also known as Rockwood Partners LP) – The Connecticut-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $156,631, prejudgment interest of $9,222.16, and a penalty of $72,135.23.
  • Seawolf Capital – The New York-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $192,730, prejudgment interest of $7,842.28, and a penalty of $96,365.
  • Solus Alternative Asset Management – The New York-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $39,600, prejudgment interest of $895.22, and a penalty of $65,000.
  • SuttonBrook Capital Management – The New York-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $70,000.
  • Troubh Partners – The New York-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $262,744, prejudgment interest of $39,315.13, and a penalty of $106,651.15.
  • Vinci Partners Investimentos – The Brazil-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $283,480, prejudgment interest of $23,487.08, and a penalty of $141,740.
  • Whitebox Advisors – The Minnesota-based firm agreed to pay disgorgement of $788,779, prejudgment interest of $48,553.49, and a penalty of $365,592.83

Pillsbury’s Investment Funds Team regularly advises clients on how not to show up on lists such as these.